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NOTES AND RECENT CASES
aid to predictability.20 If these pre-licensing statements are to be subjected to
immediate judicial review, however, agencies can scarcely be expected to make
them freely.
The instant case is a warning that these announcements, though addressed
only indirectly to members of the public, and enforceable only on the contin-
gency of an administrative hearing, are nevertheless reviewable if they invite re-
liance by the ordinary businessman, and this reliance results in irreparable harm.
RIGHT OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO DISPOSE OF
PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY CONDEMNATION*
In i914, the Sanitary District of Chicago acquired certain land by condemna-
tion under a statute providing, "Such sanitary district may acquire by purchase,
condemnation or otherwise, any and all real and personal property, right-of-way
and privilege .... that may be required for its corporate purposes .... and
when not longer required for such corporate purposes, any such sanitary district
may sell .... all such real and personal property, right-of-way, and privilege.",
The condemnation order awarded compensation "for the taking of said fee sim-
ple title of said real estate for the corporate purposes of said petitioner and for all
other lawful purposes." In 1937, the Sanitary District undertook to sell and
convey the land to the defendant. Upon a tender of a warranty deed, the de-
fendant declined to accept on the ground that the Sanitary District had only a
right-of-way and not the fee simple. The Sanitary District then sued for specific
performance of the contract. The defendant argued that the condemnation
statute did not authorize the taking of a fee simple and furthermore, that if it
did, it was unconstitutional because it would permit the Sanitary District to
condemn for a private use in violation of the Illinois Constitution. From a de-
cree for the Sanitary District the defendant appealed. Held: Affirmed. The
statute authorized the taking of the fee simple and the statute was not uncon-
stitutional. The Sanitary District had acquired a fee simple which it could con-
vey to the defendant in performance of the executory contract. The Sanitary
District of Chicago v. Manasse.2
The decision seems sound. The express stipulation in the Illinois Constitu-
tion which limits the interest which may be condemned for railroad tracks to an
easement3 and the omission of a similar limitation in the sections of the consti-
tution and of the statutes applicable to this case would appear to bring the case
within the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
20 Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies: Report of the Committee on Ad-
ministrative Procedure, 77th Cong. 1st Sess., at 26-27 (1941).
* The Sanitary District of Chicago v. Manasse, 380 Ill. 27, 42 N.E. (2d) 543 (1942).
'Ill. Rev. Stat. (i941) c. 42, § 327. In a portion of the section which has not been copied the
sale of specified tracts without the approval of the Department of Purchases and Construction
is prohibited.
2380 Ill. 27, 42 N. E. (2d) 543 (1942). 3 In. Const. art. 2, § 13.
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A more important reason for the conclusion that the Sanitary District had a
fee simple is that the devise of an interest which expires when the property
ceases to be devoted to public use does not protect owners of property against
overzealous or corrupt public officials. The danger that property will be taken
for a purpose other than a public use is not great since the courts scrutinize care-
fully the program in connection with which condemnation is sought.4 More-
over, the history of the building of the railroads in Illinois does not indicate that
the constitutional provision which prohibits the condemnation of a fee for a rail-
road right-of-way has discouraged the construction of railroads and thus pro-
tected the owners of Illinois land against the promoters.3
From the point of view of the individual owner, even if the interest taken is
limited to an easement or a determinable estate, his loss is usually as great as
though the fee simple had been taken because, i) so long as the public use con-
tinues, it is not usually feasible for the owner to make any use of the land, and 2)
since the date of the termination of the use cannot be fixed more definitely than
"when the use ceases," the value of the interest retained is nominal. Consequent-
ly the owner should receive, and doubtless does receive in most cases, compensa-
tion for an interest which will endure forever.' Should the interest taken expire
because the public use is abandoned, the former owner, having been fully com-
pensated, acquires a windfall. Moreover, the inability of the public agency to
put the land on the market may well cause the continuance of unsound public
enterprises which would otherwise be materially modified or liquidated and the
proceeds applied to new projects which were more useful.7
A method which would afford the maximum of protection to owners without
unduly limiting the public agencies would be to give the owner whose land has
been condemned a right of pre-emption if the property is put on the market.
Such a right is given under certain conditions by the English Lands Clauses
Consolidation Act, 1845.8 But even though a right of pre-emption has not been
authorized in Illinois, the conclusion that the interest of the Sanitary District
was a fee simple which might be sold is both desirable and dearly justified by
the Illinois Constitution and statutes.
4 Tedens v. The Sanitary District of Chicago, 149 Il. 87, 36 N. E. 1033 (1894).
s Steam Railways-Miles of Road Owned, by States: i86o to 1939, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 46o, table 498 (1941). This table indicates that nearly 8,ooo miles of railway
lines have been built in Illinois since the adoption of the constitution which reserves the fee in
lands condemned for railroad tracks.
6 In one case it was said that "It is a fair assumption that a condemnation price is always
about three times the price which could otherwise be obtained ..... " U.S. v. Certain Land in
Falls Twp., 38 F. (2d) zo9, 110 (1930).
7 This difficulty is noted in the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency Report on Excess Con-
demnation 5o (1918). To avoid the difficulty an attempt was made in the Illinois Constitu-
tional Convention of 19 2o-1922 to eliminate the clause which prohibits the taking of the fee for
railroad tracks. Britton, Constitutional Changes in Eminent Domain in Illinois, 2 Ill. L. Bull.
479, 5o6 (1920).
s 8 & 9 Vict., c. 1S, §§ 127-30 (1845).
